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Da jia hau. The purpose of my visit to China is to introduce, and talk about, my book
which was recently translated in Chinese. Its title is: Conflict of Norms in Public
International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law.

In my talk today, I want to elaborate on this book and ask the question of what it means
for China.

My goal is, firstly, to put the relation between trade and other international law – if you
wish, the interaction or balance between economics and politics – in a historical
perspective.

I will, secondly, talk about why it is so important today for the WTO to open its doors to
outside international law – be it general principles of public international law, IMF rules,
free trade agreements or treaties on health, the environment, core labor standards or
cultural diversity. My claim is that such “opening up” policy – within strictly defined
limits -- is needed for the very survival of the WTO, and to give effect to the sovereign
diversity between WTO members.
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Thirdly, I will demonstrate how the WTO already opened-up in its first 10 years of
operation, and this in sharp contrast to the old GATT days. Even if one were, therefore,
against a more open WTO, it is crucial to realize that today the WTO already opened its
doors to outside international law, and to deal proactively with this new situation.
Fourthly, and finally, I will elaborate on how the WTO’s opening-up could affect China
in WTO dispute settlement. I will do so through a number of concrete examples.

Most importantly, I will cast the debate in the context of China and try to convince you
that -- although some of you may think that China has most to gain by keeping the WTO
separate from other international law -- it may actually be in China’s best interest for the
WTO to “open up”.
China’s self-proclaimed goal of a “harmonious world” and a “harmonious society”1 seem
ideally suited to support a healthy balance between free markets and social concerns, or
between what I call here economics and politics. The same could be said about China’s
Confucian social context. Moreover, China’s quest for sovereign diversity and its stated
goal of amicably settling trade disputes and concluding free trade agreements (China is
currently negotiating more than 20 FTAs), all require a flexible WTO that is open to
other international compromises and agreements.

For what it is worth -- and to some this may come as a surprise -- my current home
country, the United States, has traditionally been skeptical about WTO panels looking at
other international law. As the sole super-power today, it is often said that the United
States prefers discreet “coalitions of the willing” for each subject matter. Moreover, as
the US State Department’s former legal adviser himself recently admitted, since the
1990s, the United States has been far from enthusiastic “about the value of multilateral
conventions and undertaking new international legal obligations”.2
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Nonetheless, and this is important, in October 2005, even the United States formally
accepted that WTO law is “itself public international law” and must be interpreted with
reference to other international rules, including non-WTO treaties concluded between the
disputing parties.3

Some commentators speculate that “China, like all rising powers, will most likely seek to
change the status quo, and this, as a practical matter, means breaking international law
and asserting new international norms”.4 Others have been more optimistic and noted
that “China’s participation in international organizations since it joined the UN in 1971
has been marked by an overall pattern of more or less continuous improvement in its
compliance with international norms and rules”.5

The jury is out. Although my talk today does not address the broader issue of China’s
attitude toward international law generally, my presentation must be read with those
speculations in the background.

I.

A Historical Perspective on the Interaction between Trade and International
Law

*

It is easy to forget how recent modern international law really is.

In Europe, the idea of sovereign and equal states concluding legally binding treaties is
less than 400 years old. It was consecrated in the Treaty of Westfalia, signed in 1648 and
making an end to both the Thirty Years’ War between Catholics and Protestants and the
secular dominion of the Holy Roman Empire.
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In China, and the East more generally, modern international law is even more recent. It
was introduced -- or should we say force-fed? – less than 200 years ago. For China, the
Treaty of Nanjing, signed in 1842 and the first of a series of so-called “unequal treaties”,
ended both the Opium Wars with England and the Sino-centric, tributary system of the
Celestial Empire with China as the so-called “Middle Kingdom”.

*

It is equally easy to forget how trade forms the bedrock of that modern

international law.

One of the first principles introduced by the very founder of international law, my
compatriot Hugo Grotius, was that of “freedom of the seas”. This principle was at least
partially inspired to facilitate Dutch domination of world trade through Holland’s
unrivaled naval power.

Similarly, the first push by Britain to conclude a treaty with China was driven by trade.
When, in 1792, King George III sent Lord Macartney to China, it was to seek “the end of
the restrictive Canton trading system, the opening of new ports for international
commerce and the fixing of fair and equitable tariffs”.6 The Emperor’s response is, by
now, legendary:

“We have never valued ingenious articles, nor do we have the slightest need of
your country’s manufactures”.

As you can see, trade deficits with China are nothing new: Britain already had one in the
19th Century. Fortunately, the remedy has changed: In the 19th Century, Britain exported
opium (and started a war); today, China buys US treasury bonds.

That trade is the linchpin of international law was, more recently, confirmed by China’s
accession to the WTO (which, of course, is a dramatic departure from the Empirial
6
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statement that I just quoted). More so than the 1971 transfer of China’s permanent seat
on the UN Security Council to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), WTO membership
has rekindled Chinese interest and commitment to international law. Conversely, it has
led to statements that China has “a special responsibility to protect and grow the
multilateral trading system”.7

*

At the same time, the link, or balance, between trade law and other branches of

international law has varied over time. In some ways it has proven to be cyclical.

In the very first treaty concluded by the United States – the 1778 Treaty of Amity and
Commerce with France – peace, commerce, navigation, territorial delimitation and
liberties and immunities for aliens, were all dealt with in one single legal instrument.
This holistic approach changed dramatically at the end of the First and, especially, the
Second World War.

Rather than integrated in one regime or treaty, international law was gradually
fragmented along functional lines: in 1919, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
was created to address labor questions; in 1945, the UN was set up to deal with peace and
security, the World Bank to address development, the IMF to tackle monetary questions
and the GATT to deal with trade. In subsequent decades, as new problems arose,
separate treaties and international organizations were established – once again on
functional lines -- to address human rights, the environment, intellectual property,
culture, and so forth.

*

Although this expansion of international law has mostly been welcomed as

beneficial, it did, over time, create problems of coordination and coherence.

In domestic legal systems functional specialization does exist in different ministries and
bureaucracies. However, within states, there is a central legislator, executive and
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judiciary that bring everything together in a legal system where hierarchies are
established based on the source of the legal norm. In the case of China, for example, the
Constitution prevails over Basic Laws of the National People’s Congress (NPC) which,
in turn, prevail over laws of the (NPC) Standing Committee which, in their turn, trump
administrative regulations by the State Council.

In international law, in contrast, there is no centralized legislator or world government,
and each state decides for itself what treaty or organization it wants to join. Moreover, in
international law, with the exception of jus cogens, there is no inherent legal hierarchy:
all sources of international law (custom, treaties and general principles) have the same
value. More specifically, and exception made of the prominence of UN Charter
obligations, no pre-determined hierarchy exists between different treaties enacted by, for
example, the WTO as opposed to the UN, IMF, UNESCO or the ILO.

Combine this expansion of international law with the general lack of hierarchy between
international norms and the sad fact that different teams of negotiators for one single
country not always coordinate, and the challenge of fragmentation and conflict between
international norms is unavoidable.

*

There is no doubt that today also China faces this challenge. In a clear break with

its past skepticism toward international law -- previously seen by China as either the
source of quasi-colonial occupation or a tool of Western imperialist powers -- since the
1979 “opening up” policy, China has signed a host of new treaties and became member
of an increasing number of international organizations. In 2005, China was reported to
be a party to 273 multilateral treaties, out of which 239 (that is, 92 %) became applicable
to China only after 1979.8 In 2006, China was said to be a member of 46
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intergovernmental organizations.9 In other words, overlaps and possible conflicts
between treaties and international organizations has become an issue also for China.

II.

The Current Tension between WTO and Other International Law and Why
the WTO Must “Open Up”

*

Let me now focus on what is perhaps the most acute and most interesting source

of coordination and conflict problems, namely: the question of how WTO law (centered
on free markets and economics) relates to other branches of international law (especially
those expressing politics or written to deal with market failure or externalities).

There is an obvious reason for why the WTO is at the center of the fragmentation debate.
Much like a vacuum cleaner sucks up its surrounding environment, the new, compulsory
and fully automatic WTO dispute settlement system can suck up just about any dispute
that is even tangentially related to trade. Any WTO member has the full and automatic
right to sue any other WTO member about any alleged trade restriction. No such right
exists in most other international organizations. This has led complainants to bring
disputes that were not centrally based in the WTO treaty to WTO dispute settlement.
Conversely, it has led defendants to rely on all kinds of non-WTO rules of international
law (ranging from IMF recommendations and environmental treaties to drug conventions
and regional trade agreements) in defense of their trade restrictions. This tendency is
simply unavoidable and over time is destined to increase.

*

Yet, besides the uniquely automatic and binding WTO dispute process, there is

another, more fundamental reason for why the WTO is at the heart of the fragmentation
debate. This reason is a substantive one, centered on the WTO’s focus on deregulation
and free, economic markets as the optimal way to organize society.
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Thus looking at civilization through an exclusively economic prism is relatively new.
The WTO’s almost religious belief in free trade as a solution to most of the world’s
problems (ranging from war to poverty) is equally new. It used to be otherwise.

In ancient Greece, for example, during the days of the Greek city-states, trade and
commerce were looked at with contempt. Aristotle tells us that in Thebes any person
who had at any time during the previous 10 years engaged in trade was simply not
eligible for any political office. Citizens were forbidden to take part in industry and
trade, both of which were activities regarded with disdain and to be left to aliens.

With the end of the cold war (and the victory of capitalism over Soviet communism), the
subsequent establishment of the WTO and the so-called “Washington Consensus”, the
pendulum swung completely: Rather than looked at with contempt, trade and the free
market place became the new religion, a worldview where economics was to silence the
excesses of politics.

This prevalence of economics over politics can be seen already in, for example, the 1947
Havana Charter (later reduced to the GATT), which recognizes that parties

“should not attempt to take action which would involve passing judgment in any
way on essentially political matters”.10

Equally, the Work Bank’s Articles of Agreement provide that, in bank operations such as
loans, “only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions”.11

As all pendulums go, however, there is the tendency to go from one extreme to the other
and, if so, counter-balancing forces are triggered almost automatically. Where ancient
Greece clearly underestimated the worth of trade, economics and free markets, in today’s
wave of globalization the opposite is true: The religious belief in economics and pure
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market forces has gone to extremes and, in response, all over the world counter-balancing
forces were triggered.

To put it differently, politics is back, both in its attractive manifestations, such as greater
demands for participation and accountability in the global economy and with the ugly
face of politics, such as protectionism, nationalism and fundamentalism.

This counter-balancing pressure of politics is felt also on the WTO. It started with the
1999 protests in Seattle, the disenchantment of developing countries and manifests itself
today through the collapse of the Doha Round negotiations and the resurgence of
protectionism.

This return of politics has also put pressure on the WTO to factor in non-economic
concerns in the settlement of trade disputes, including outside treaties. This political
counter-weight to globalization’s exclusive focus on economics and markets is, in my
view, the second reason for why the WTO is at the forefront of the debate on
fragmentation of international law. Together with the automatic WTO dispute settlement
system, it explains why the interaction between WTO law and other norms of
international law, in particular those concerned with market failures and market
externalities such as poverty, health, the environment, labor and cultural diversity, has
become such a pressing topic.

*

In my view, and this is the central message of my speech, it is crucial for the

WTO to open its doors to those non-market concerns – if you will, those manifestations
of politics -- for the simple reason that not doing so would undermine the legitimacy and
long-term survival of the multilateral trading system. To put it differently, if we do not
let in those benign manifestations of politics, the grave danger is that the ugly face of
politics resurfaces, more specifically: rampant protectionism, fundamental nationalism
and, God forbid, war.
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Let us not forget that the world’s first experimentation with an exclusively economic or
market view of civilization -- that is, the first wave of globalization during the second
half of the 19th Century -- ended in disaster and two world wars. To avoid such violent
swing of the pendulum from economics back to the ugly face of politics we must take on
board the legitimate demands of politics.

Such injection of politics into the WTO should not be limited to giving policy space to
WTO members to enact domestic rules and regulations to address questions of
redistribution, poverty and non-economic, social concerns. As global competition often
makes it difficult for states to enact such flanking policies on their own, the WTO must
equally open its doors to international treaties concluded with non-economic concerns in
mind. Such international treaties are what enable countries to step out of the regulatory
race to the bottom and to collectively deal with the social side of globalization. Thus, for
the WTO to recognize such international treaties – only, of course, as between the
signatories of those treaties -- is as important as it is to give broader domestic policy
space to WTO members.

Moving away from a situation of self-contained regimes in international affairs is not
only needed for the long term survival of distinct international organizations such as the
WTO. A more holistic approach is also needed to avoid double work, overlap and
conflicts and, most importantly of all, to effectively deal with today’s global problems.
As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared recently:

“Today’s threats to our security are all interconnected. We can no longer afford
to see problems such as terrorism, or civil war, or extreme poverty, in isolation.
Our strategies must be comprehensive. Our institutions must overcome their
narrow preoccupations and learn to work across the whole range of issues, in a
concerted fashion”.12
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III.

How the WTO Has “Opened Up” in Its First 10 Years

As applied to the rather limited and technical field of how WTO panels can take account
of non-WTO treaties, let me explain how this “opening up” could be done, and is already
happening in practice. I will then end my talk with a few examples on how such
reference to outside international law could affect China.

In contrast to the old GATT’s ostrich-like approach of sealing off trade questions from all
other international debates, the new WTO struck a far more conciliatory tone. Its very
preamble now stresses the incorporation of developing countries into the world trade
system as well as the goal of sustainable development. More importantly perhaps -although on paper seemingly less dramatic -- Article 3.2 of the new WTO dispute
settlement understanding explicitly directs panels and the Appellate Body to clarify WTO
agreements “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law”.

In its very first report, on US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body jumped on that direction to
dramatically declare the end of GATT’s isolation from other rules of international law.
No doubt influenced by a prominent public international lawyer in its midst, Florentino
Feliciano of the Philippines (who also happened to be the Presiding Member in the
Gasoline case), the Appellate Body states that Article 3.2 of the DSU

“reflects a measure of recognition that the GATT is not to be read in clinical
isolation from public international law”.

The extent or level of this “measure of recognition” of public international law, was
subsequently further elaborated in a number of seminal cases.

As a result, today, WTO panels routinely refer to general principles on proportionality,
burden of proof, standing, due process, good faith, representation before panels, the
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retroactive application of treaties or error in treaty formation. None of these principles
are set out in the WTO treaty itself. All derive from public international law.

More controversially, the Appellate Body has also dealt with international health and IP
standards, environmental treaties, the precautionary principle, drug and labor conventions
and regional trade agreements. All of these were equally created outside the WTO.

The legal foundation for these references to outside international law was well
summarized in the conclusions of a recent report on “Fragmentation of International
Law” by the UN International Law Commission (a report in which your compatriot Ms.
Hanqin Xue, Chinese Ambassador to the Netherlands, played a prominent role)13:

“Even as it is clear that the competence of WTO bodies is limited to consideration
of claims under the [WTO] covered agreements (and not, for example, under
environmental or human rights treaties), when elucidating the content of the
relevant rights and obligations, WTO bodies must situate those rights and
obligations within the overall context of general international law (including the
relevant environmental and human rights treaties)”. (para. 170)

“A limited jurisdiction does not, however, imply a limitation of the scope of the
law applicable in the interpretation and application of those treaties”. (para. 45)

“This means that although a tribunal may only have jurisdiction in regard to a
particular instrument [such as the WTO treaty], it must always interpret and apply
that instrument in its relationship to its normative environment - that is to say
“other” international law”. (para. 423)

To be fair, I quote this ILC report so extensively because what they say is exactly what I
had proposed and advocated in my book.
13
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Crucially, also WTO political bodies have, in the first 10 years of WTO operation,
actively engaged with other international organizations and non-WTO treaties. The
WTO has concluded agreements with all kinds of international institutions ranging from
the IMF to the World Bank and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. WTO members
took cognizance of other international treaties in a variety of ways, ranging from
renewing their commitment to “internationally recognized core labour standards” in the
1996 Singapore declaration and the enactment of waivers to accommodate the Lome
Convention on bananas and the UN-sponsored Kimberley scheme on conflict diamonds,
to stressing, in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health that
TRIPS “be part of the wider national and international action to address” HIV/AIDS.

In sum, the WTO has already opened its doors to outside international law. Whether one
likes it or not, this new situation is a reality. This new reality must be taken account of,
by all sides, and cannot be swept under the carpet. In essence, whenever China, or any
other WTO member, agrees to a new international norm or treaty, it must realize that this
agreement can boomerang in the WTO. Negotiators must realize that even deals made
outside the four walls of the WTO may have an impact on WTO affairs, including WTO
dispute settlement.

IV.

Examples of How Outside International Law Could Affect China in WTO
Dispute Settlement

The first reaction of many in the developing world is one against opening WTO doors to
outside international law. For many, such opening up policy is seen as thinly disguised
protectionism by rich countries. As I pointed out earlier, however, opening WTO doors
is not about protectionism. It counts as much for the rich world (stressing environment
and labor) as for the poor world (stressing redistribution and preferential treatment for
development). Indeed, was one of the very first cases considered under WTO rules
against China (though never officially filed) not one raised by the EC against Chinese
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export restrictions on coke which China, at least partially, explained on environmental
grounds?

What is more, as I explained earlier, an open door policy at the WTO is needed to prevent
protectionism and nationalism, or what I called the ugly face of politics. It is about
rebalancing the hegemony of economics with the benign input of politics, a move which I
see as absolutely necessary to maintain popular support for the world trade system in both
rich and poor countries.

To underscore this point, let me give you a few examples of how other international law
could be, and could not be, played out by or against China in WTO dispute settlement.
These examples will, at the same time, confirm the important limits on the WTO open
door policy that I advocate here.

*

First, outside international law cannot be used “offensively”: It is out of the

question that, for example, the United States or the European Communities (EC), could
sue China before a WTO panel for breach of human rights or labor standards. Crucially,
this is so even for those human rights or labor standards that China agreed to. And
remember, China has agreed to more ILO core labor treaties than the United States (4 out
of 8 versus 2 out of 8). The reason why the WTO cannot entertain claims of human
rights or labor violations is simple: the jurisdiction of WTO panels is limited to claims of
WTO violation. It does not include jurisdiction over claims of human rights or labor
violations. This is the first limit on my WTO open-door policy: the limit of WTO
jurisdiction.

To put it differently, for the WTO to open its doors to other international law is not the
same as saying that somehow all international law must now be made and enforced at the
WTO. Let the specialization and division of labor between international organizations
continue. Let the ILO set labor standards, the WHO set health standards, the UN agree
on human rights and the WTO discipline trade policy. Such division of labor is efficient,
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creates healthy competition and operates as a checks and balances, by far to be preferred
to one single world government.

Yet, when it comes to applying any of these rules, created in different fora, it is crucial to
interpret and apply those rules in the context of, and in a way that takes account of, all
other rules. In that sense, international law is a universe of islands, but islands that are all
interconnected.

*

Second, although no claims of human rights or labor violation could be brought to

the WTO, a WTO “open door” policy, as I described it, would mean that claims of WTO
violation are to be evaluated against possible defenses under other treaties. Put
differently, although outside treaties cannot be used “offensively”, they can be used
“defensively”. Crucially, however, such other treaties could only be held against a
complaining party if that party has agreed to that outside treaty. This is the second limit
of my WTO open-door policy: the limit of state consent.

Let’s take the example of the UN Kimberley Scheme against conflict diamonds. This
scheme calls for certain trade restrictions on conflict or blood diamonds as between
participants. Now, if, for example, South Africa were to enact such restrictions, and
China challenges those trade restrictions before a WTO panel then the WTO panel should
consider possible defenses under the Kimberley Scheme. Yet, it should only do so
because both South Africa and China are parties to this scheme. If China were not a
party to the outside treaty – as is the case with certain human rights, labor or
environmental treaties – then the outside treaty could not be held against China.

Conversely, if the United States were to sue China over alleged currency manipulation
then China should have the right to invoke possible defenses under the IMF articles of
agreement, in particular, China’s right to maintain a pegged currency. Why so? Because
both China and the United States have agreed to this IMF rule and the United States
cannot pretend before a WTO panel that the IMF does not exist.
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To put it differently, an open door policy for the WTO is subject to state sovereignty:
only outside rules binding on the disputing parties should be referred to. This applies for
the Kimberley scheme on conflict diamonds and IMF rules, as much as for the
Carthagena Protocol on Biosafety, the new WHO Convention on Tobacco Control or the
recent UNESCO Treaty on Cultural Diversity.

What is more, such open door policy is not only subject to, but gives expression to, state
will: It acknowledges the sovereign diversity between WTO members and lets them
refine, alter or add to their relationship with other countries in other fora in ways that are
subsequently respected also before a WTO panel. As China highly values the principle
of state sovereignty, it should, therefore, welcome a WTO open door policy.

The same should apply as regards decisions of international organizations. If, tomorrow,
Myanmar were to challenge the US trade embargo against it, then surely the United
States should be allowed to refer to the 2001 ILO recommendation calling upon all ILO
members to take action against Myanmar for its grave breach of the prohibition on forced
labor. As Myanmar is an ILO member and agreed to ILO enforcement proceedings,
Myanmar should live with this ILO recommendation, also before a WTO panel. Again,
the WTO would not thereby condemn Myanmar for ILO breach. This is outside the
WTO’s jurisdiction. It would only give effect to a ILO permission for ILO members to
impose trade sanctions on Myanmar.

Conversely, if China were to win a WTO dispute against the United States, the United
States refuses to implement and China obtains the right from the WTO to suspend certain
of its IP obligations as against the United States as a form of cross-retaliation, what
happens if the United States subsequently challenges China before WIPO?

As in the Myanmar example, under an open door policy, WIPO should then open its eyes
to the WTO grant of authority for China to suspend US patents or copyrights, and permit
China to invoke this WTO permission in defense of any violation of its WIPO
obligations.
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*

Third, reference to outside international law by WTO panels must respect third

party rights. A WTO open door policy would permit WTO members to bilaterally settle
any trade dispute. Doing so, WTO members might even alter or deviate from preexisting
WTO rules. As noted earlier, such possibility fits well with China’s stated preference for
bilateral settlement. The 2005 MOFCOM Investigation Rules of Foreign Trade Barriers
(China’s equivalent to US Section 301) explicitly states that MOFCOM is to terminate
investigations when China is provided with “proper trade compensation”. Settlement
rather than retaliation and protracted litigation may also conform better to China’s
Confucian social context.14

At the same time, China should rightly worry about settlements between other countries
(say, the US and Europe) that violate China’s WTO rights, in particular China’s MFN
rights. That is why settlements or, for that matter, any other outside treaty, can only be
referred to by a WTO panel if it respects third party rights. The rule that a treaty cannot
affect third parties is enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article
34). This is the third limit of my WTO open-door policy: the limit of third party rights.

*

Finally, and very importantly, a WTO open door policy would also take account

of steps agreed on in bilateral or regional trade agreements. Such agreements must, of
course, comply with GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V. However, once two or
more WTO members agree to something in an FTA, they should not be allowed to retract
from such agreement before a WTO panel.

Let me explain by giving you two examples that involve China.

Article 9 of the 2004 trade in goods section of the FTA between ASEAN and China
(ACFTA) permits the imposition of safeguards against ACFTA imports during a
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transition period. It seems to do so without requiring “unforeseen developments”, a
requirement explicit in Article XIX of GATT. What if China imposes a safeguard on
goods from ACFTA parties but not from other WTO members and, for example,
Thailand challenges this Chinese safeguard before a WTO panel as a trade restriction in
violation of MFN and the GATT Article XIX requirement of “unforeseen
developments”?

Pursuant to a WTO open door policy, China should have the right to invoke Article 9 of
ACFTA to justify its safeguard as one that Thailand explicitly agreed to in ACFTA.
Thailand cannot now renege on its ACFTA concessions and revert to China’s preACFTA obligations under the WTO. Article 44 of the recent FTA between China and
Chile provides for a similar safeguard mechanism.

Let me give you another example, one that is more likely to arise in practice (as it almost
did in recent WTO cases such as Argentina – Poultry and Mexico – Soft Drinks).

Like many FTAs, Article 2.6 of the Agreement on ACFTA dispute settlement includes a
clause on forum shopping. It provides that if a dispute can be brought under two treaties,
one of which is ACFTA and the other, for example, the WTO, once dispute settlement
proceedings have been initiated under either ACFTA or the WTO

“the forum selected by the complaining party shall be used to the exclusion of any
other such dispute”.

This provision, included also in Article 81 of the FTA between Chile and China, is there
to avoid duplication of proceedings, waste of resources and the potential for conflicting
rulings on the same dispute.

Now, what if Singapore or Chile disregards this provision and, over the same trade
measure, sues China first before an FTA panel and subsequently before a WTO panel?
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The answer under a WTO open door policy is clear: In that event China would have the
right to invoke the forum exclusion clause in the FTA in its defense and, on that basis, a
WTO panel would have to decline jurisdiction. As Singapore and Chile explicitly agreed
with China not to bring the same case first under the FTA and then before the WTO, why
should a WTO panel disregard this defense?

V.

Conclusion

Let me stress what I want you to take away from this talk.

Given the historical interaction between trade and other international law, economics and
politics, it is crucial for the WTO to open up to the benign elements of politics.

Besides giving WTO members sufficient policy space domestically so as to deal with
questions of poverty, redistribution, environmental degradation and other non-economic
concerns, the WTO must also open up to international efforts and treaties that address
these non-trade concerns. As countries find it increasingly difficult to address these
concerns on their own, because of regulatory competition driven by globalization,
solutions to these social problems are likely to be offered also through international law.

If so, for the WTO’s own long term survival and to neutralize the ugly face of politics
(namely protectionism, nationalism and violence), it is crucial that the WTO take account
of that other international law.

I have shown you how this could be done specifically in WTO dispute settlement. In the
process, I hope that I have convinced you that a WTO “open door” policy is also in
China’s best interest.

Shieh shieh. And I very much look forward to your comments and reactions.

